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former proceeding and that could not have been ascertained
with due diligence. [15] Since the trial on the vacation
issue has never been completed, but only suspended by the
appeal from the order denying modification of the divorce
decree, use of the evidence at the 1951 hearing does not come
within the rule that evidence at a former trial is usually
inadmissible at a second trial. (See Blache v. Blache, 37
Cal.2d 531, 534-536 [233 P.2d 547].)
[16] Neilma has filed a ·motion requesting this court to
take additional evidence under section 956a to support an
affirmance of the order denying modification of the final decree. Since there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings and the order below, no purpose would
be served by granting the motion and it will therefore be
denied.
The order denying the motion to change custody is affirmed. The motions to make a special order and to take
additional evidence under section 956a are denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J ., and
Spence, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 18596. In Bank. July 11, 1952.]
MARVIN HANDLER, Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Mandamus-Pleading-Demurrer to Petition.-Where respondents demurred generally to a petition for a writ of mandate
and the matter was argued on questions of law and submitted
to the court which rendered judgment that petitioner take
nothing and that the alternative writ be dismissed, the allegations of the petition must be accepted as true.
[2] District and Prosecuting Attorneys-Deputies and Assistants.
- Gov. Code, § 31000, declaring that board of supervisors may
contract with and employ any person for furnishing special
services and advice in financial, economic, accounting, engineering, legal or administrative matters, authorizes board
of San Mateo County, whose charter makes applicable "general
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 88; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 364.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 88; [2] District and
Prosecuting .Attorneys, § 16; [3, 4] Counties, § 31.5; [5] Public
Utilities, § 48; [ 6] Counties, § 120.
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[3]

[4]

[6]

[6]

laws of the state" in matters relating to employment, to
contract with or employ an attorney and a traffic engineer.as
"special assistants to the District Attorney'' for performance
of special services in opposing rate increases of a public utility.
Counties-Officers and Employees-Specialists.-Employment
of an attorney and a traffic engineer as specialists for performance of special services for a county need not be by
ordinance as distinguished from a resolution, where the charter
provisions, which refer to action by ordinance, deal with
officers and regular employees, deputies and assistants.
!d.-Officers and Employees-Specialists.-Persons performing
specialized expert services for a county do so on a temporary
basis and are neither officers nor employees; they are more
akin to independent contractors.
Public Utilities-Hearings-Who May Make Complaint.-Pub.
Utilities Code, § 1702, declaring that complaint may be made
to the Public Utilities Commission by any "body politic" or
"municipal corporation" as well as others concerning the rates
charged by any public utility, authorizes a county to appear
in rate regulation proceedings before such commission.
Counties-Fiscal Matters.-County has power to expend money
for employment of a specialist to oppose increase in rates
of a public utility where, among other factors, the county has
a public interest in affording protection to a substantial portion
of the residents or prospective residents who are affected.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Edmund Scott, Judge. Reversed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel county auditor to approve, and county treasurer to pay, claim for legal services.
Judgment denying writ reversed.
Paul A. McCarthy and Howard Magee for Appellant.
Louis B. DeMatteis, District Attorney, Keith C. Sorensen
and John A. Bruning, Assistant District Attorneys, for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate
to compel the controller of San Mateo County to draw a
warrant for payment of his claim for $1,500, which had
been approved by the board of supervisors. An alternate
[5] See Clal.Jur., Public Utilities and Services, § 32; Am.Jur.,
Public Utilities and Services, § 218.
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writ was issued and respondents, as their return thereto,
demurred generally to the petition. [1] The matter was
argued on questions of law and submitted to the court which
rendered judgment that petitioner take nothing and that
the alternative writ be dismissed. Under these circumstances
the allegations of the petition must be accepted as true.
(Merchants Serv. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 35 Cal.2d 109,
110 [216 P.2d 846] ; Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal.2d 569, 571
[170 P.2d 904]; 16 Cal.Jur. 866 et seq.)
According to the petition, plaintiff is an attorney admitted
to practice in California and has been specializing for 15
years in public utility rate regulation. The Southern Pacific
Company operates passenger trains between San Francisco
and San Jose and way points in San Mateo County. It
applied to the Public Utilities Commission for an increase
in passenger fares on such trains. Commuters in San Mateo
County formed an association which employed plaintiff to
represent them to resist the application before the commission. Plaintiff arranged with Fred Chestnut, a traffic engineer, to assist him. The proceeding is now, and has been
sincfl 1949, pending before the commission and plaintiff has
been performing the services for which he was employed.
On November 25, 1949, the board of supervisors of the county
at a meeting "agreed to employ" plaintiff and Chestnut as
"special assistants to the District Attorney" and to appropriate up to $2,000 toward their compensation for services in
opposing the rate increases if proportionate amounts were appropriated by the municipalities and contributed by the commuters in the county. The funds from other sources were
obtained and on June 20, 1950, the board adopted a resolution by a four to nothing vote (there was one vacancy),
wherein it was declared that the fare increase would be
detrimental to the general welfare of the county and it is
to the best interest of the county to oppose the increase.
Therefore, $1,500 is transferred from the unbudgeted reserves
to the 11 .Advertising Budget, Maintenance and Operation,
Promotional Requests-Various and Sundries Appropriation''
to be used to employ plaintiff and Chestnut as special assistants to the district attorney to oppose the increase. On June
30, 1950, plaintiff presented a verified claim to the board for
the $1,500. It was approved and ordered paid. Thereafter,
the county controller refused to approve the claim and the
instant action followed.
The sole contention made by the controller is that the
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county has no authority to expend money for the employment of a person to oppose the increase in rates of a public
utility. At the argument in the District Court of Appeal it
was suggested that specialists could not be employed except
by ordinance. In a letter to the District Court of Appeal
thereafter in that connection, counsel for the controller statP.d
that he did not question the power of the board to employ
specialists· by resolution; he contended only that the county
funds could not be used to oppose an increase in utility rates.
The District Court of Appeal nevertheless based its decision
on both grounds and both will be discussed.
San Mateo has a charter adopted in 1933 pursuant to the
Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7%) and approved by
the Legislature (Stats. 1933, p. 2953). It has been amended
from time to time. Pertinent provisions relating to employment are that the board of supervisors has the power given
to it by the Constitution, charter and ''general laws of the
state." (Charter, art. III, § 1.) In addition to other powers
it has the power to appoint appointive officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the charter ; to confirm appointments of officers appointed by the county manager
(formerly county executive, changed by Stats. 1949, p. 2938);
to provide by ordinance for the compensation of appointive
officers ; ''To provide, by ordinance, and therein to fix and
regulate, the appointment and number of assistants, deputies, clerks, attaches, and other persons to be employed, from
time to time, in the several offices of the county, and therein
to prescribe and regulate the powers, duties, qualifications
and compensation of such persons, the times at which, and
the terms for which, they shall be appointed, and the manner of their. appointment and removal; provided, however,
that tne ·provisions of such ordinance or ordinances, so to
be enacted by the Board of Supervisors, shall in all respects'
conform to and comply with all other provisions of this Charter with respect to the manner and method of appointment
and removal of sucJt assistants, deputies, clerks, ~ttaches and
Qther employees, their powers, duties, qualifications, compensation, the times of their appoiD.tment and the terins for
which they shall be appointed." (Stats. 1943, p. 3147.) To
provide by ordinance for other officers recommended by the
county manager; to provide ~or the creation of offices hereafter created by the Constitution or general law. (Art. III,
§ 2.)
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The general law provides: ''The board of supervisors may
contract with and employ any person for the furnishing to
the county, or for and on behalf of any district within the
county for furnishing to the district, of special services and
advice in financial, economic, accounting, engineering, legal,
or administrative matters by any persons specially trained
and experienced and who is competent to perform the special
services required. The board may pay from any available
funds such compensation to any such expert as it deems proper
for the services rendered.'' (Gov. Code, § 31000.) There
is also a provision, particularly directed to legal matters :
''The board of supervisors of any county not having a charter which creates the office of county counsel may employ
and contract with counsel to assist the district attorney in
representing and advising it and all district officers in all
matters and questions of law pertaining to their duties and
to civil legal questions affecting the county or districts.''
(Gov. Code, § 31001.)
[2] The general law, supra, which, as seen, the charter
expressly makes applicable, clearly gives authority to the
board to contract with or employ plaintiff and Chestnut 8B
the furnishers of special services. Moreover, in this connection, it should be observed that the charter authorizes the
county manager to employ, with the approv8.1. of the board,
''experts and consultants to perform work and advise in
connection with any of the functions of the county when
economically advantageous." (Art. V, § 2 [f].) (See Kennedy v. Ross, supra, 28 Cal.2d 569.) While it was not alleged that the employment and appropriation here was approved by the county manager, it is so stated in plaint:iif's
brief and not denied by defendants.
[3] It is equally clear that the employment of such spe. cialists for the performance of special services need not be
by ordinance, as distinguished from a resolution. The charter provisions heretofore discussed, which refer to action by
ordinance, deal with officers and regular employees, deputies and assistants and it is regulating their duties, compensation, etc., that the board acts by ordinance. [4] Persons performing specialized expert services do so on a temporary basis and are neither officers nor employees, nor do
they hold a position with the county. They are more akin
to independent contractors. Similar services were considered
by this court in Kennedy v. Ross, supra, 28 Cal.2d 569, where
we were considering whether a contract to engage an archi-
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teet for a special task required an exemption from civil
service laws by the Civil Service Commission. We said (p.
572) : "Under the contract, the petitioner was not appointed
to nor does he hold a position in any department or office
of the city. The contract calls for his expert professional
services on other than a permanent basis, but it does not follow that he is thereby employed in a position in any department of the city. The fact is otherwise. No position, temporary or permanent, in any department, was thereby created as contemplated by section 143 of the charter. The petitioner was engaged to do a specific expert professional task
for a stated consideration. 'Positions' in 'departments and
offices' of the city connote an employment to render services
at a salary paid periodically and are governed by the salary
standardization and related provisions of the charter, also
invoked by the respondent." (See Ban Francisco v. Boyd,
17 Cal.2d 606 [110 P .2d 1036].) It is true that plaintiff
was referred to as a special assistant to the district attorney, but we do not think that took him out of the category
considered in the Kennedy case.
To determine the legality of the expenditure for plaintiff's
compensation for opposing the rate increases before the commission it is necessary to apply pertinent principles. · As we
have above seen; the charter and general laws contemplate
the employment of specialists for aiding the county in the
performance of its functions. The charter also provides :
"The County Manager shall have plenary power, subject
to the provisions of general laws, with respect to advertising or exploiting the resources of the County. He shall, exofficio, act as secretary of any County board of trade or County
chamber of commerce created under the provisions of the
general laws, and in the event of the disestablishment of any
such County board of trade or County chamber of commerce, he shall perform the duties and functions customarily
performed by the secretary of such County board of trade or
chamber of commerce. He shall consult with the Board of
Super:v:isors with respect to any appropriations made by the
Board of Supervisors for advertising or exploiting such resources. Any appropriation made by said Board of Supervisors shall be upon the recommendation of the CoUn.ty Manager." (Art. V, § 3.) He also has power "to employ, by
and with the approval of the Board of Supervisors, experts
and consultants to perform work and advise, in connection
with any of the functions of the County, when economically
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advantageous." (Art. V, § 2 [f).) The general law provides : ''The board of supervisors may levy a . . . tax . . .
for the purpose of inducing immigration to, and increasing
the trade and commerce of, the county. The proceeds of the
tax may be expended for any or all of the following uses :
(a) Advertising, exploiting, and making known the resources
of the county. (b) Exhibiting or advertising the agricultural,
horticulttrral, viticultural, mineral, industrial, commercial, climatic, educational, recreational, artistic, musical, cultural,
and other resources or advantages of the county. (c) Making plans and arrangements for a world's fair, trade fair,
or other fair or exposition at which such resources may be
exhibited. (d) Doing any of such work in cooperation with
or jointly by contract with other agencies, associations, or
corporations.'' (Gov. Code, § 26100.) Other laws have contemplated that the counties may have an interest in the
rates of utilities operating therein. [5] The public utility
law provides that complaint may be made to the Public
Utilities Commission by any "body politic" or "municipal
corporation" as well as others concerning the rates charged
by any public utility (Pub. Utilities Code, § 1702.) This
provision of the public utilities law clearly authorizes the
county to appear in rate regulation proceedings before the
Public Utilities Commission. (See Inter-State Water Oo. v.
City of Danville, 379 Ill. 41 [39 N.E.2d 356].) The Public
Utilities Act does not purport "to restrict such complaints
to patrons of the utility and the language of the above cited
section clearly indicates that a "body politic" may act on
behalf of its inhabitants in the prosecution of such complaints.
Certainly, the rates charged by the only railroad traversing
a county has a bearing upon the trade and commerce affecting the county and whether people will choose to make it
their home. Also, exploitation of the resources of the county
can be m;1de mor.e effective depending upon the rates of the
carriers operating therein. Apparently the board considered
tP,at such objects would be advanced. [6] Where a substantial portion of the residents or prospective residents are affected, the county has a public interest in affording them
protection. In speaking of public interest in the operation
of a municipality in another connection it was said, quoting
from Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 [40 S.Ct. 499, 64 L.Ed.
878] : "What is a public purpose has given rise to no little
judicial consideration. Courts, as a rule, have attempted
no judicial definition of a 'public' as distinguished from a
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'private' purpose, but have left each case to be determined
by its own peculiar circumstances. Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power, section 176, 'Necessity alone is not the test by
which the limits of state authority in this direction are to
be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look beyond the
expenditures which are absolutely needful to the continued
existence of organized government, and embrace others which
may tend to make that government subserve the general
well-being of society, and advance the present and prospective
happenings and prosperity to the people': Cooley, Justice,
in People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 [4 Am.Rep. 400]." (City
of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 332 [274 P. 329] .) In
Ci_ty of Birmingham v. Wilkinson, 239 Ala. 199 [194 So. 548],
the court held it to be a proper expenditure to employ counsel to appear before the public service commission to obtain
better telephone rates as it was for the welfare of the city.
.(Contra, City of Purcell v. W adlim.gton, 43 Okla. 728 [144
P. 380].)
Taking into consideration all the foregoing provisions of
the general law, charter and legal principles we believe it
may be properly said that the county has the power to expend money for the purpose here present.
There 'being adequate authority for the employment of
petiti<?ner and · the expenditure of public money for the purpose for which he was e:rp.ployed, the court should have ordered
the issuance of the writ.
The judg~ent is reversed.
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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